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It is undoubtedly the case that cine-psychoanalysis no longer has the 
dominance within film studies that it once had. While those of us with 
certain misgivings about psychoanalysis might welcome this change, we 
should not lose sight of why it had such a stranglehold on criticism in the 
first place.1 Beyond the analogy of the cinematic experience to dreaming, 
claims for the ‘unconscious’ underpinnings of the cinematic apparatus, or 
even the ‘symptomatic’ status of the image, the underlying reason I would 
suggest is that cinema, like psychoanalysis, is fascinated with sex. Whether 
mainstream or art house, metaphoric or explicit, of direct narrative concern 
or a more general framing through which events unfold and moods are 
established, it is clearly the case that sexual desires and behaviours dominate 
a great many films. Cinema talks to and of our sexual being and seems 
particularly well equipped to not only help us think about sex via it’s on-
screen representation, but also through its more affective, expressive and 
evocative capacities, to offer us a deep engagement with our feelings about 
sex. In this respect, it would be far more surprising if the conjunction had not 
taken such firm root. Sex matters to both psychoanalysis and cinema in 
profound ways, as a foundation of identity, as a driver of behaviour and as 
an articulation of difference. While one may take issue with the 
interpretation of sexuality offered by psychoanalytic criticism this does not 
prevent one agreeing with it on the centrality of sex to our lives and as a 
consequence of this claim, the vital role sexuality plays in our understanding 
of, and engagement with, cinema. In this respect we must not confuse a 
                                                
1 This is one of my biggest problems with the rather blanket rejection of 
cinepsychoanalysis as called for by the likes of David Bordwell and Noel Carroll. 
Ther attack on method leaves little room for sympathy with the questions asked and 
posed by psychoanalysis, questions which still seem fundemental to to our 
understanding of the cinematic experience. 
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questioning of its methods with a rejection of its interests. Indeed, with so 
many films representing sex as a pathological force in our lives, the link 
between the psychological and the cinematic seem even more pertinent.  
Yet, it is precisely the power and seductiveness of this pathological 
interpretation of sex that should cause us to pause, particularly in 
conjunction with the penetration of psychoanalytic ideas and tropes into 
Western culture, which can seem to prefigure the problems of sex in 
exclusively psychoanalytic terms. Aesthetic metaphors too quickly become 
psychological displacements, struggles between two men necessarily reveal 
something oedipal and any malignant force can be explained, or explained 
away, as the return of the repressed. The model, even if only at the level of 
pop psychology, precedes and influences the production of Western film to 
such an extent that it becomes both the object and method, risking a 
hermetically sealed circularity in which theory is elevated to fact. Now, 
rather than a way of understanding this pathology as a potential, sex and 
sexuality risk becoming something which are necessarily pathological. Even 
at its best, there is something wrong about sex. There seems little room here 
for any understanding of sex (whether utopian or quotidian) as something 
which might sustain us, let alone bring pleasure, satisfaction, or even, dare 
one say, happiness. Under such a regime of thought ‘good’ sex is seen at best 
as a normative fantasy reduced on screen to the banality of (overwhelmingly 
heterosexual) romance or the triteness of pornography while the negativity of 
bad sex ossifies rather than articulates our sexual situation. Rather than tales 
of bad sex, sex itself becomes bad, a cause of misery to which we can 
respond with either theological despair or ironic detachment. Todd Solondz’s 
black tragic-comedy Happiness combines both reactions and presents us with 
what I think is a strikingly psychoanalytic vision of a world made miserable 
by sexual desire and bifurcated by sexual difference. The film presents a 
series of failing marriages, abusive sexualities and alienated individuals 
whose sexual desires compete rather than ever meet. It focuses on three 
generations of the Jordans, a white, middle-class, New Jersey family, and a 
brief description of their fundamentally unhappy intra- and extra-familial 
and sexual relationships sets out what is at stake.  
The grandfather, Lenny Jordan (Ben Gazzara), has just announced to 
his wife, Mona (Louise Lasser), that after forty years of marriage he loves no 
one and now wants to be alone. However, while unable to emotionally 
engage with either his wife or his family, he cannot simply leave. When a 
widow, Dianne (Elisabeth Ashley), seduces Lenny and after extremely 
hurried intercourse tells him not to feel guilty, Lenny simply replies, ‘I don’t - 
I don’t feel anything’. On the other hand and in keeping with the film’s 
misanthropic narrative, we discover that subsequent to this encounter Dianne 
has had a stroke. Lenny and Mona’s youngest daughter, the ironically named 
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Joy (Jane Adams) is thirty, still living at home and unhappy in both her job 
and her relationship. She opens the film splitting up from her boyfriend Andy 
(Jon Lovitz) during a dinner date. The event does not go well and Andy’s 
subsequent fate (we discover that he has committed suicide), like Dianne’s, 
demonstrates that relationships with the Jordans generally have dire 
consequences. Not that the Jordans themselves fare much better; Joy remains 
single for the rest of the film. However, as with her father, we do see her 
have a brief sexual encounter with a recent Russian émigré called Vlad (Jared 
Harris). As with Lenny and Mona the event is more mechanical than 
passionate with Vlad leaving almost immediately after he has achieved 
climax, but it is at least seen to put a smile on Joy’s face the next day. 
Unfortunately even this pleasure is short lived as it turns out that Vlad is in a 
relationship and the smile is removed when his angry partner punches Joy to 
the ground at work, sealing her public humiliation. For good measure, she 
also discovers that Vlad has stolen her stereo.  
On the face of it, the Jordans’ oldest daughter, Trish Maplewood 
(Cynthia Stevenson), has the perfect upper-middle-class existence with her 
large house, uniformed maid, three children and a husband, Bill Maplewood 
(Dylan Baker) who is a successful therapist. However, the marriage has 
grown sexless and it turns out that Bill is developing paedophilic tendencies 
which he is unable to master and during the course of the film he commits 
two child rapes and is arrested. Finally their second daughter, Helen (Lara 
Flyn Boyle) has a successful career as a writer and a string of well muscled 
lovers, but she has adopted a totally cynical attitude towards her life’s work, 
which she feels lacks worth and meaning. The closest she comes to an 
emotionally fulfilling encounter is with an abusive telephone caller named 
Allen (Phillip Seymour Hoffman), who calls her while she is berating her lack 
of authenticity and wishing she had been raped as a child, an event she is 
convinced would have given her writing the gravitas she craves. Allen abuses 
her for being nothing, worthless, a void. By directly agreeing with Helen’s 
own self-criticism, he raises the momentary possibility of Helen actually 
having a genuine emotional response to another person. It also sexually 
excites her, particularly as Allen claims ‘I’m gonna fuck you so hard, you'll 
be coming out of your ears’. Unfortunately, rather than an exotic sexual 
predator, Allen turns out to be a sexually terrified and deeply unattractive 
ginger-haired loser, so it comes as no surprise that when they do eventually 
meet, the encounter fails. Although Allen generally spends his lonely evenings 
in a miasma of masturbation, alcohol and self-loathing he does manage to 
spend one intimate evening with likewise lonely neighbour Kristina (Camryn 
Manheim). While rather dowdy and extremely overweight, Kristina does 
appear to have genuine affection for Allen and although he shuns her at first, 
they do eventually go out for a date. They dance together, they talk together 
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and even, platonically, sleep together. However, Kristina admits she is 
disgusted by sex, an aversion undoubtedly intensified by the fact she was 
raped by her doorman. Worse, subsequent to the attack rather than report 
him to the police Kristina simply snapped his neck and then disposed of his 
dismembered body in her freezer.  
What are we to make of this litany of pain, abuse, uncontrollable 
desires and social and sexual failure and how should we interpret and 
articulate it if not through psychoanalytic means? One thing which seems 
abundantly clear is that no one is actually happy in Happiness, indeed the 
desire for happiness, particularly as sought through sex, love, or 
companionship is presented as the cause of their misery. It is not just that 
these characters want what they cannot have, but their refusal to give up 
wanting what they cannot have that seems to be the problem. Furthermore, 
the problem seems not merely a matter of the impossibility of forming 
sustaining intersubjective sexual relationships, but also of their prohibition, 
as there appears to be a narrative duty to ensure there are no healthy sexual 
relationships. Vlad could easily have been single (and honest), and with time 
Kristina might well have developed a capacity for sexual intimacy (had she 
not been a killer), but the text’s universalisation of misery wins out. No one 
is either nourished or satisfied by their encounter with the other as no one 
seems to offer what is being truly sought. Besides supporting the rather 
obvious and generalised psychoanalytic claim that unconscious desires of a 
sexual nature drive these characters behaviour, it is the focus on their desires 
being driven by a sense of lack that seems significant. In the disjunction 
between their keen self-awareness that something is missing from their lives 
and their incredulity towards the things (and people) with which they try and 
plug the gap, these characters seem not just psychoanalytic, but particularly 
Lacanian subjects. I would even suggest that the film’s totalisation of the 
failure of intersubjective heterosexual life could be read as a materialisation, 
albeit a narratively extreme one, of Lacan’s infamous claim that ‘there is no 
sexual relationship’.2  
Lacan’s point, of course, was not to deny the reality of physical 
relationships between men and women, but essentially to claim that there is 
no logical relationship between sense and sex. What we think we want or 
need at the psychic level to make up for our sense of lack is never met by 
what we do at the physical level. In his claim that ‘there is no sexual 
                                                
2 The amount of literature on this topic from within the psychoanalytic field is huge. 
For the clearest explanation, see the entry in Dylan Evans, An Introductory 
Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996) 181-182. For a 
more detailed analysis of Lacan’s allied theory of sexuation see Bruce Fink, The 
Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1995) 98-123, and Renata Salecl (ed.) Sexuation: Sic 3 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000) passim. 
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relationship’, Lacan produces an antithesis – if not a full blown antinomy – 
between psychic and material sex, and it is this antinomy that is both 
presented and shared by Happiness. They both offer us worlds in which the 
rational subject and the sexual subject are not a whole, not even competing 
parts, but an uneasy coincidence that makes no sense to itself, let alone 
understands how on earth it could relate to another, despite suffering 
overwhelming urges to do so. Whether Solondz is aware of this similarity to 
Lacanian models of sexual desire or whether he is simply picking up on more 
popular psychological versions of the same themes is another matter. 
However, regardless of whether Solondz has directly or indirectly engaged 
with Lacanian theory, his film does seem to ‘think’ sexuality as an existential 
failure, a force which as with Lacan makes people who they are, but fails 
them as it can never bring satisfaction. However, I would like to argue that 
the way the film displays this logic reveals a significant aporia in both its and 
Lacan’s concept of sexual desire. In particular, the implicit understanding of 
desire as a force motivated by a sense of lack, seems to rest on a restricted 
and limiting notion of dialectical negativity. It is therefore the understanding 




Before turning to Hegel however it must be stressed that Lacan’s refusal of 
the sexual relationship is more sophisticated than it might at first appear. 
Clearly, it is not a claim that there is no sex so much as that sex can never 
make sense. The sexual relationship seems both inexplicable and axiomatic 
at the same time. Meaning is imposed on sex; not something which emerges 
from it in a natural manner. This goes beyond simply claiming it is a social 
construction, but instead presents the failure of the sexual relationship to 
make sense as almost the price of consciousness itself. This is because for 
Lacan, the formation of a ‘natural’ relationship between male and female is 
blocked by the subject’s construction by and relationship to language, which 
is different for men and women, and it is this which scuppers purely 
instinctive or biological relationships. Indeed, without language there is no 
such thing as gender so consequently no such thing as gender orientated 
desire or relationships. Hence masculine and feminine refer to different 
modes of failure that can in principle be taken up by any actual body. In 
particular, it is their fundamentally different relationship to the Phallus as 
master signifier, the different form in which ‘men’ and ‘women’ essentially 
fail to live up to the demands of the symbolic order, that produces a 
nonreciprocal difference between the masculine and the feminine. In simple 
terms ‘man’ wants to have and therefore fears losing the Phallus (and in 
attempting to identify directly with the Phallus perennially falls short of this 
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aim), while ‘woman’ on the other hand is tempted into being what ‘he’ lacks 
and therefore fears not being the Phallus. What each party fears therefore is a 
reflection of two quite different modes of lack, a lack in having and a lack in 
being. Consequently, the attempt by each partner in a couple to ‘plug the 
gap’ for the other’s sense of lack necessarily fails to live up to the different 
form in which they each fail the symbolic in the first place. The sexual 
relationship therefore cannot achieve reciprocity, it can never stand as a 
totality in which both parties can now see themselves as ‘full’. For Lacan, the 
sexual relationship is at its heart therefore a fantasy of fullness in which a 
pure subject longs to be in a relationship with a partner who offers them the 
pure otherness which they lack. As both lack and otherness comes in two 
distinct varieties – not having and not being – this relationship never, as such, 
exists.  
In many respects, Lacan’s project reflects the perennial philosophical 
quandary regarding the relationship between matter and ideas and extends it 
onto the terrain of sexuality. For some his attempt to dematerialise our 
relationship towards the phallic function (not least by using a modified form 
of predicate calculus to produce his infamous formulas of sexuation which 
map out our symbolic predicament),3 aims to describe in principle how any 
speaking beings psychically experience sex. Whether we take up a masculine 
or feminine speaking position is therefore not a matter of physiology. 
Compared with Freud’s emphasis on castration anxiety, Lacan’s linguistic 
reformulation of lack seems to offer a far less biological mode of analysis. 
Instead, it has the potential to articulate more epistemological differences 
between notions of having and being, as well as offering a more nuanced 
understanding of the differences between need, demand and desire. Slavoj 
Žižek4 has mounted a defence of the Lacanian project in these terms and 
argues that what Lacan offers is very much a description of, rather than 
prescription for, patriarchal culture. For others, the influence of castration on 
the having-being split, with ‘man’ fearing castration ( not-having the Phallus) 
and ‘woman’ fearing she already has been (not being the Phallus) means 
Lacan still produces an essentialist and heteronormative notion of sexual 
difference. Luce Irigaray (1985) for example, claims Lacan’s error is to repeat 
                                                
3 Lacan’s formulae appear in Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX 
(1972 - 1973), translated by Bruce Fink (New York and London: W.W. Norton and 
Co, 1999), 78. However, the clearest explantion of their supposed function can be 
found in Elizabeth Wright’s Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reappraisal (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1998), 174-181. 
4 Zizek seems less Lacanian in his recent work but most of his publications between 
The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989) and the Ticklish Subject (1999) offer a 
defence and use of Lacan’s ideas. For a more general overview of contemporary 
Lacanian thought on this matter see Renata Salecl (ed.) Sexuation: Sic 3 (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000). 
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rather than question society’s fundamental phallocentrism, while for others, 
such as Judith Butler, (1990, 1993) Lacan has not gone far enough in his 
linguistic turn. For Butler, the problem still lies (as it does more generally 
with psychoanalysis) in a residual biologism and essentialism. While I would 
agree that Lacan’s model of sexual difference is both conservative and 
heteronormative, I am less convinced that biologism and essentialism is either 
its cause or even quite such the absolute error its opponents have painted it. 
Indeed, I would instead suggest that the problem with both Butler and Lacan 
is neither of them is either material, or indeed, ‘biological’, enough. 
Following David McNally (2001), I would argue that both Lacan’s and 
Butler’s emphasis on meaning over matter results in the attenuation of the 
actual physical body. We might well be linguistic subjects but we are also 
embodied persons and the capacities and limitations of the human body do 
not go away simply because we are also symbolic, social, and linguistic 
creatures. Sexual expression is diverse, but it is not limitless, so while 
biological essentialism risks reductive and normative explanations of the 
historically rich and culturally diverse reality of human sexual practices, 
idealist and voluntarist explanations have their own pitfalls. Not least in 
their fetishisation of difference they risk rather overstating the diversity of 
human life over the repetitions and similarities. As Stella Sanford (1999) has 
suggested in regard to Butler, she also runs the philosophical risk of allowing 
her critique of the metaphysic of substance and her subsequent 
epistemological doubt, actually becoming a rejection of any notion of 
ontology. Butler is right to argue against essentialism’s prioritisation of the 
body as substance, but the error is merely reversed and repeated rather than 
solved by the prioritisation of the sexual body’s conceptual production via 
historically located discourses. Instead what needs to be described is the 
nature of the bond that both entwines and divides these realms. This is a task 
that is both urgent and formidable, or as Maurice Merleau-Ponty once 
described it, ‘we touch here the most difficult point, that is the bond between 
the flesh and the idea.’ (1968: 149) 
So, while we are on dangerous political ground the moment we talk of 
the natural as normal in regard to such notions of ontology this should not 
preclude us talking of the common, or the usual, particularly when offered as 
empirical description rather than ethical/political evaluations of how such 
ontology is lived. We must reject the notion that we are simply ‘natural’ 
beings without, albeit it unwittingly, suggesting we are supernatural ones 
either. Human meanings must not be divorced from human flesh. This is not 
to claim that the sexual subject is identical to the ‘sexed’ body-subject. The 
body refuses to be so easily reduced to the subject and likewise the subject is 
not confined to the body. Hence, human ontology demands the opacity of 
Film-Philosophy 15.1  2011 
 
 
Film-Philosophy | ISSN: 1466-4615   
 
40 
sexuality as much as a semiosis of the sexual, which are clearly allied but not 
identical phenomena. As Merleau-Ponty has also suggested: 
 
Understood in this way, the relation of expression to thing expressed, 
or of sign to meaning is not a one-way relationship like that between 
original text and translation. Neither body nor existence can be 
regarded as the original of the human being, since they presuppose 
each other, and because the body is solidified or generalised existence, 
and existence a perpetual incarnation. What is particularly important, 
is that when we say that sexuality has an existential significance, this is 
not to be understood as meaning that the sexual drama is in the last 
analysis only a manifestation or a symptom of an existential drama. 
The same reason that prevents us from ‘reducing’ existence to the body 
or to sexuality, prevents us also from ‘reducing’ sexuality to existence: 
the fact is that existence is not a set of facts (like ‘psychic facts’) 
capable of being reduced to others or to which they can reduce 
themselves, but the ambiguous setting of their communication, the 
point at which their boundaries run into each other, or again their 
woven fabric. (1962: 166) 
 
The biological capacities of the sexual body are neither sufficient nor 
straightforwardly causal of our sexuality but they are necessary ontological 
facilitators of such woven existence. This does not mean they are essential in 
any heteronormative sense because the capacity of the body to do a range of 
certain things and to undergo a range of certain physiological responses, are 
more than capable in their own right of disrupting heteronormative claims. 
However much patriarchal ideologies have attempted to confine sexual 
behaviour to an expression of our reproductive function, the empirical 
evidence clearly demonstrates that our sexual being resists such confinement. 
According to the archaeologist Timothy Taylor for example, ‘as soon as 
there are written records, from around 5,000 years ago in the Near East, we 
find references to many of the sexual practices - homosexuality, male and 
female transexualism and transvestism, masturbation - familiar to us 
today’.(1997: 182) Interestingly, the last of these practices, our capacity to 
enjoy autoerotic pleasure, has a long history of inducing anxiety not simply 
for heteronormativity, but also for psychoanalysis and it is an activity that is 
of major importance to the narrative Happiness. It is unlikely that a practice 
that has been so heavily tabooed in Western society, a phenomenon often 
described as not merely sexually but socially aberrant, could appear on film 
as mere indifferent observation. However, despite its Art House radicalism, 
in its representation of masturbation Happiness actually reproduces the 
standard condemnatory heteronormative discourse regarding the autoerotic. 
The masturbators in this film are sad, bad or even mad, but it is a 
condemnation that throws an interesting light on our understanding of what 
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precisely sex ‘is’. This in turn has a consequence on our understanding of 
what sexual relations are, or could be and therefore what it is to claim that 
they do, or do not, exist. As shall be discussed momentarily, Lacan takes and 
equally dim, but (logically) distorted view of masturbation and the 
comparison of the one with the other suggest a prioritisation of discourse 
over embodiment with reactionary consequences. 
 
III 
On the one hand masturbation’s status as a solitary act has raised concerns 
over its precise ‘sexual’ status as, being unpartnered, masturbation seems to 
be not-sexual or even anti-sexual. At the same time, however, in bringing 
about orgasm masturbation is patently sexual. Masturbation can therefore be 
read as a boundary phenomenon because it is both within and without the 
field of sexuality as usually conceived and hence a privileged site of logical 
analysis because it is a content that brings into question the truth claims of 
its own form. It seems to be quite seriously bad sex in so many ways, bad in 
terms of it being worthless sex, dangerous sex and even, not proper sex. So, 
how does Happiness reveal these anxieties and present this pathology? 
Despite the black comedy, there are moments in the film which are treated 
with a great degree of seriousness. The most important of these comes when 
Bill confesses his paedophilia to his twelve year old son, Billy (Rufus Reid). 
Until this moment, their relationship has been based on mutual honesty and 
love, but Bill’s behaviour and his brutally honest confession utterly destroys 
any trust Billy has in him. While he is able to allay Billy’s fear that his father 
would actually rape him, Bill is unable to deny that if drugged into 
submission (as were his previous victims), Bill would be unable to resist 
‘jerking-off’ over him.  
This reference to the autoerotic is of enormous significance, as it has 
become clear by this stage of the film that masturbation (or, more accurately, 
male masturbation) is presented as a symptom (and quite possible a cause) of 
the misery on display. We have already seen the beginnings of Bill’s 
paedophilia when he masturbates in broad daylight while parked outside a 
mall, using a children’s magazine as a pornographic prop. At this stage our 
future sexual predator is clearly a slave to his passions, and the urgency of 
his need suggests his desires are having him rather than the other way 
around, in a way that presents male masturbatory desire as both abject and 
self-serving. However, the autoeroticism on display in the film is rarely 
solitary, but usually involves the abuse of another. Masturbation is not 
simply presented as what it usually is, unpartnered sex, but is specifically 
articulated as ‘anti’- partnered sex. In Bill’s case, the inappropriate use of a 
children’s magazine and masturbating in a public space suggests this abuse at 
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the level of desire, but it is also presented in more explicit terms when we see 
Allen masturbating while making an obscene telephone call to Joy.  
The scene begins with Joy, alone in her parents’ kitchen, waiting for a 
call from Damian, a potential blind date. Allen meanwhile is trying to call 
Helen, upon whom he is becoming more and more sexually fixated. The 
assumption is that he has tracked down Joy by chance. The fact that he has 
gotten through to the wrong sister seems unimportant to Allen, who uses 
Joy’s openness (and her belief that he is Damien) to pose a number of ever 
more personal questions while he masturbates. As the conversation becomes 
less innocent (are you alone, what are you wearing, what are you wearing 
beneath your jeans), the framing moves from a single shot of Joy, to a half-
wiped split-screen of both Joy and Allen, and then wipes to Allen alone. Joy 
realises her error and puts the phone down just as Allen asks his first fully 
obscene question (‘is your pussy wet?’) and he begins to orgasm. This is 
represented as realistically as possible within the constraints on 
representation at the time, in that, although the erect penis is discreetly 
hidden by the telephone console in the foreground, a reverse shot of ejaculate 
hitting the wall by the phone leaves little doubt as to the nature of the event. 
Beyond the visceral realism, what dominates the mise-en-scène is the split-
screen staging of a telephone conversation, an unmistakable intertextual 
reference to the use of split screens in the romantic comedy Pillow Talk 
(Michael Gordon, USA, 1959). Unlike the relationship in Pillow Talk 
between Brad (Rock Hudson) and Jan (Doris Day) however, there is no 
underlying mutual attraction here (however initially tense or inverted into 
mutual hostility) which can be worked through. Allen and Joy do not 
misunderstand each other; they do not know each other. Indeed, despite the 
normative emphasis on the formation of the heterosexual couple in so many 
romantic comedies, we must not forget how much sexual negotiation takes 
place in such films. Rather than presenting simplistic ideologies of ‘true love’, 
people have to change in ways that take account of their differences for the 
couple to form. As Kathrina Glitre (2006: 159-177) has suggested of Pillow 
Talk, the split screen reveals the sophistication and complexity of the 
relationship on display as it both materialises these differences as well as 
conjoining Brad and Jan, bringing them together by demonstrating their 
mutual intrusion into the other’s life. They are frequently framed in similar 
ways, emphasising balance as much as friction. In Happiness, the framing is 
often very unequal (Allen in extreme close up, Joy in medium long shot) and 
it simply marks the couples’ mutual isolation and once again enforces that 
‘there is no sexual relationship’. This is particularly true of the final wipe 
which removes Joy from the picture entirely. Unlike Brad, Allen’s self-serving 
masturbatory priorities demonstrate that seduction was never his aim; hence 
the subjectivity of his interlocutor is of little interest to him. That she is a 
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woman is enough. Unlike Jan (who wanted sex but only on her terms) and 
Brad (who was prepared to marry), in Joy and Allen’s world the sexual and 
the romantic are antithetical desires which seem to drive people apart rather 
than towards any form of mutual recognition or negotiation.  
Happiness ends with yet another scene of masturbation. The Jordans 
are having a family dinner. Lenny sits at the head of the table, but still wants 
to be alone, Helen informs Joy that she has arranged a blind date for her 
with Allen, while Trish puts a brave face on her broken marriage and now 
imprisoned husband. Meanwhile we see Billy achieve his first masturbatory 
orgasm while spying on a sunbathing woman from the apartment balcony. 
Even this potentially innocuous event is represented as deeply abject by first 
showing the family dog licking Billy’s ejaculate off the balcony railings, and 
second having the dog wander back into the apartment and immediately lick 
Trish’s face. After this quasi-incestuous spermatic transfer and Billy’s 
bathetic declaration, ‘I came’ followed by the stunned silence of family in 
response, the film ends. This dénouement undoubtedly suggests that the 
fleeting and infantile pleasure of autoerotic sex (or the momentary relief from 
sexual tension experienced after the act), defines (and negates) happiness. 
 What is the basis for this overwhelmingly negative (if not hysterical) 
attitude towards what is essentially an innocuous (and ubiquitous) sexual 
practice? It could be argued that this negativity on display is merely a 
continuation of the anti-masturbation hysteria which arose in the early 
eighteenth century and which has persisted with varying degrees of intensity 
ever since.5 Nevertheless, the vehemence of the antipathy remains surprising, 
particularly for a film that many would see as sexually radical. It becomes 
less so if we assume the film adopts or reflects a psychoanalytic approach to 
autoeroticism, as masturbation is seen to be problematic for a number of 
reasons from this persepective. Masturbation seems to collapse the 
distinction between the sexuality of men and women, adults and children, 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, in ways that call into question the policed 
boundaries of sexual difference. It is too polymorphously perverse (Freud 
even condemned it as a perversion), and too queer a practice to be granted a 
non-pathological status as simply a shared aspect of adult human sexuality. 
From a psychoanalytic position it seems as if it is a practice that must be 
infantilised if it not to open up a site of adult sexual similarity and self 
sufficiency rather than difference and lack. It is also a practice which can be 
identified as sexual without conferring a gendered sexual identity. More 
particularly, masturbation seems to collapse the distinction between the 
                                                
5 For a detailed history of this hysteria see Peter Lewis Allen, The Wages of Sin: Sex 
and Disease, Past and Present (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) and 
Thomas Laqueur, Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation (New York: 
Zone Books, 2003). 
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pleasure principle and the death drive. While its aim is to reduce tension and 
excitation, and therefore is allied to the life preserving instincts of the 
individual, this is only achieved through the negation of their reproductive 
capacities and in this regard is seen as anti-life. Furthermore, the moral and 
interpersonal anxiety produced by the act cancels out masturbation’s 
potential to reduce the individual’s excitation. Finally, it seems perverse 
because masturbation is presented in both Solondz film and more generally 
in psychoanalytic theory as a threat to partnered sex rather than as an 
alternative, or supplement, to partnered sex.  
This anxiety over the autoerotic seems to raise a real concern that 
psychoanalysis is proscriptive rather than descriptive of patriarchal demands 
that reproduction take precedence over pleasure. Freud’s earliest writings on 
the subject in his 1898 paper ‘Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses’ 
makes this clear. Freud’s concern was specifically with the growing 
contraceptive practices and desires of middle class couples, not least ‘the 
current Malthusian tendencies to limit the offspring of marriage’. (Freud 
cited in Nye, 1999: 141) His particular worry was that family planning was 
achieved either by neurosis-inducing abstinence or neurosis-inducing and 
potency reducing masturbation. He states: 
 
If masturbation is the cause of neurasthenia in youth, and later on also 
has its aetiological significance in the anxiety-neurosis by its action in 
reducing potency, then the prevention of masturbation in both sexes is 
a task that deserves more attention than it has received up to the 
present time. On considering both the slight and the serious disabilities 
that have their root in neurasthenia, which is apparently growing more 
and more prevalent, it becomes evident that it is positively to the public 
interest that men should enter upon sexual relations with full potency. 
(in Nye, 1999: 142)  
 
By 1905, in his ‘Three Essays on Sexuality’, Freud was describing the origins 
of ‘onanism’,6 and the role it plays in the development of infantile sexuality.7 
While his acknowledgement of the reality of infantile genital stimulation 
seemed progressive, the elision of this infantile practice with the 
physiologically and psychologically distinct practice of orgasm-producing 
adolescent or adult masturbation is deeply problematic. It suggests that it is 
                                                
6 Onanisim refers to the sin of Onan who spilled his ‘seed’ on the ground rather than 
impregnate his dead brother’s wife as required by law as described in the Old 
Testament (Genesis 38 4-10). While it seems more likely that his sin was a 
contrapceptive rather than masturbatory practice, it came to stand as a euphemism 
for masturbation from the early eighteenth century onwards. 
7 For his primary account of this see Sigmund Freud, ‘Infantile Sexuality’ in On 
Sexuality, Penguin Freud Library, 7, translated by James Strachey (London: Pelican 
1977), 88-120. 
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the behaviour of the infant agent, rather than his genetically preordained 
physiological development, that will lead to the development of an adult 
subject capable of genital orgasm. Rather than an origin, infantile 
masturbation can be equally described as a pale imitation of a future 
developmental capability, which has no more of an impact on adult sexual 
development than infantile babbling has on adult oration. In combination 
with Freud’s physiologically inaccurate model of spermatic production, that 
it was this limited resource which made the subject masculine (rather than 
the truth that the male body perpetually manufactures the substance), 
masturbation was seen as a hysterically dangerous narcissism which literally 
risks the physical and moral health of the masturbator.  
While Freud’s concern to promote vaginal rather than clitoral orgasm 
demonstrated his equal anxiety over the autoerotic potential of women, by 
the time we get to Lacan, the censure is almost entirely directed at men. 
Indeed, Lacan suggested as late as 1973 (seminar XX) that phallic pleasure 
outside a system of exchange (or put more simply, male masturbation), could 
offer nothing but ‘the jouissance of the idiot’. (1999: 81) As his protégée and 
editor Jacques-Alain Miller has described it, masturbation is the archetypal 
doing related to this phallic having. Miller states that ‘having is clearly linked 
to masturbation. Phallic jouissance is proprietary jouissance par excellence’ 
(Miller, 2000, 20). So, in wanting to own his own pleasure the masturbating 
man reveals he is not already the master of his own body but merely a slave 
to his passions and in linking it to a masculine notion of having, 
masturbation is something which has now become gendered. What seems 
particularly at stake now is the role that men’s autoerotic capacities play in 
the engendering and/or blocking of their sexual relationships. Is 
masturbation a reaction to, a manifestation, or a cause of there being ‘no 
sexual relationship’? The film seems to make manifest what psychoanalytic 
theory fears: male sexuality is essentially masturbatory and hence incapable 
of a full sexual relationship. At the same time, the absence of any female 
masturbation in the film manifests a belief in a certain feminine frigidity that 
equally, albeit in a different way, prevents fulfilling sexual relations. This 
produces a paradox in which heterosexuality is seen as essentially ‘not’ 
heterosexual, even after the development of a ‘proper’ sexually opposite 
object. It also suggest that rather than a failure to live up to the symbolic 
order, the impossibility of the sexual relationship is premised on a split 
between an inward facing obsession with, or outward facing denial of, the 
body.  
This begs the questions as to whether there is another way to articulate 
sexual desire or to map out human sexuality, one that refuses to think of it as 
grounded in such a wretched relationship between autoerotic desire, gender 
and sexual fulfilment. Furthermore, it also calls on us to consider whether 
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the anxiety over the autoerotic within the psychoanalytic field in general and 
Lacan in particular is not simply a symptom of prudishness or patriarchal 
alliances but a necessary result of his underlying sexual logic which is, as I 
shall argue, an erroneous interpretation of the dialectical logic. This is where 
a re-examination of Hegel’s theory of recognition as described in 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1997: 104-138) and its relation to Lacan’s model 
of desire, is instructive.  
 
IV 
According to Elisabeth Grosz, one of the most influential theorists to bring 
Lacan into general academic discourse, ‘Lacan derives his conception of 
desire from Hegel, particularly from The Phenomenology of Spirit, where 
Hegel posits desire as a lack and an absence’. (1990: 64) A note specifies that 
it is the section on Lordship and Bondage that is of most relevance. In this 
section Hegel outlines how our desire for recognition can find its expression 
in the most aggressive and proprietary terms, which has come to be 
characterised as the master-slave relationship. To begin, Hegel claims that 
beyond being conscious of sensuous objects in the world, consciousness in 
Man is also always self-conscious, i.e., aware of its own operation. It is this 
self-reflexive moment that gives rise to the subject-object relationship at the 
heart of self-consciousness. I am both conscious of the objects in the world 
(which I may identify and possess) and of the fact that it is I who is conscious 
of them. This awareness of one’s own self-consciousness logically implies 
that other human bodies are not merely objects in our world, but likewise 
subjects in theirs. The other is not simply an object that can be possessed 
without a struggle; he/she enjoys the opacity of subjectivity. Recognizing 
one’s status as a full subject therefore requires recognition of the self by the 
other, but there is no guarantee that the other, as an independent agent, will 
grant said recognition. What is so threatening about this Hegelian scenario is 
that not only is there a good chance that we will not receive the recognition 
of our subjectivity that we desire, but that the other potentially sees us as an 
object, an object that it likewise wishes to possess. This potential is 
intolerable for a nascent self-consciousness. Hence, a life-and-death struggle 
is envisioned, in which the combatants are prepared to risk everything to 
secure recognition from the other and so become the sole absolute subject. 
However, to kill one’s other is to lose the possibility of him or her granting 
us the recognition we seek, so instead the victor subjects the other to actual 
or virtual slavery which is chosen by the loser in place of death. This 
confirms the victorious self-consciousness as a new type of subject: a master. 
However, the process is self-subverting, for a mere object (a slave) cannot 
give recognition adequate to the master’s needs. So, there has to be a part of 
the slave that the master does not possess, in order for the slave’s recognition 
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to have any value. The paradox and paranoia of the master’s position arises 
here, for he both wants and does not want to fully possess the slave. 
Generally, the solution for most masters is to attempt to possess their slaves 
while keeping them at a safe enough distance to allow them to preserve this 
un-enslaved kernel.8  
Clearly there are many moments when the abusive men of Happiness 
attempt to become sexual masters, but they also are aware of how this desire 
both enslaves them to their passions and grant those whom they wish to 
enslave a profound power. The emphasis on abusive forms of male 
masturbation materialises the inherent negativity and self-subverting nature 
of the desire to sexually possess the other, while keeping her at a safe 
distance. In this sense, their masturbatory acts are not autoerotic, in that they 
are not solitary and private, but are staged as attempts to sexually consume 
the other and gain recognition of their sexual being. Yet, they are clearly 
masturbatory, in the sense that (in the end) it is only the self who is sexually 
touched and consumed, as the other remains too distant and/or objectified to 
be properly engaged with. In being staged at enough distance to prevent a 
potentially threatening ‘real’ encounter with the other, this ‘safe’ distance 
also ensures the other can never deliver the sexual recognition the men 
actually seek. Allen literalises his paradoxical desire to dominate women 
while avoiding actual contact with them by becoming an abusive telephone 
caller; Bill maintains his psychic superiority by abusing children; even young 
Billy maintains a spatial distance from (and voyeuristic power over) the 
object of his desire. In all three cases, there is no sexual ‘relationship’. 
Meanwhile even the men who do have sexual intercourse, Vlad and Lenny, 
remain emotionally distant from both their own sexual performance and that 
of their partners. In the end, all the men use or abuse other people to varying 
degrees, but this abuse never actually provides them with the satisfaction 
they seek. The fortification of the self against the authority of the other 
prevents a genuine encounter. In the end, the men do little more than 
objectify themselves, and their mastery becomes little more than an 
addiction, an ahistoric treadmill of repetition. As Hegel explains more 
generally of such fleeting and blocked encounters: 
 
In this satisfaction, however, experience makes it aware that the object 
has its own independence. Desire and the self-certainty obtained in its 
gratification are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes 
from superseding this other; in order that this supersession can take 
place, there must be this other. Thus self-consciousness, by its negative 
relation to the object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of 
                                                
8 It must of course be remembered that Hegel is proposing a thought experiment 
regarding the development of consciousness. The historical reality of the master’s 
indifference to the slave is therefore of no relevance. 
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that relation that it produces the object again, and the desire as well. 
(1997: 109) 
 
This repetition at the heart of desire might seem to follow the Lacanian 
model of lack. In turn, this does seem to map rather easily onto the male 
characters in Happiness, where masculine sexuality demands the recognition 
of the master and in wanting to so fully ‘have’ the other, reduces femininity 
to ‘being’ the slave. In Happiness, the ‘tragic’ gap inherent in male sexual 
mastery is presented as that between the power of male desire and the fear of 
its aim. It is through the experience of the gap, and most vitally the repetition 
of this experience across a number of male subject positions, that masculine 
desire is both homogenised and represented as its own punishment. 
However, there are a number of problems with this analysis both in terms of 
its interpretation of Hegel and what occurs in Happiness.  
First, while Hegel certainly discusses desire throughout this section and 
desire undoubtedly involves a relation with something or someone beyond or 
outside the subject, at no time does he explicitly claim that the desire for 
recognition is synonymous with lack. It is true that the subject does not have 
what they want but there is a world of difference between desire therefore 
being an awareness of this lack, or this lack only coming to light as a 
consequence of the encounter. We must not forget that the master and the 
slave are not subjects (neither master nor slave have any subjective status 
prior to their encounter), but figures at the beginning of an unfolding process 
of subjection. The master’s desire and subsequent sense of lack is not the 
original condition, but the first of a chain of consequences that flow from the 
primacy of the subject coming to self-consciousness. Rather than a subject 
who feels incomplete, it is only the growing self-awareness of being 
incomplete - the development of self-consciousness itself - that produces any 
subject in the first place. Desire produces lack rather than lack producing 
desire, because ‘self-consciousness is Desire in general’ (1997:105). The 
difference is not without consequence. 
The key point to note is that the negativity that drives the system is as 
much an internal property as it is the product of a failed encounter. For 
Hegel dialectical logic attempts to understand the essence of a concept, thing, 
state of affairs, or subject, not merely as a statement of identity (what it is), 
but as non-identity (what it is not). However, what it is not, is not what it 
lacks, but what it has in the form of a necessary, but external relation. The 
other with who it is in relation is therefore both an essential element of its 
being, yet an external element of its being. Essences are not therefore essences 
of things, essential properties or traits that are immanent to the subject, but 
essences of transcendent relationships, or better still, shared boundaries that 
stage events rather than static attributes that fix meaning. There is no such 
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thing as a self without an other, a slave without a master, or a consciousness 
without an unconscious. This is the logical priority of negativity in dialectical 
thought, where contradictory relations between people and things are seen as 
both the source of their identities and the engine of change that kept these 
identities evolving. If lack is simply another word for relationship it is one 
which carries unnecessary pessimistic connotations. Negativity is therefore 
not reducible to lack. Rather than a marker of absence, it is simultaneously 
both an immanent and transcendent condition (it belongs to the subject and 
the system in which they find themselves) and a literally productive force that 
drives the system to ever greater complexity. So, while the dialectical method 
does attempt to conceptualise a synthesized totality beyond negativity, it does 
not do so with recourse to an arithmetical and hence potentially excluding 
notion of such a totality. The totality or absolute is neither unitary, it is not 
‘one’, nor is it arrived at through addition and therefore is incapable of 
lacking. The priority of the absolute in Hegel is therefore not a fascistic 
desire to obliterate difference, for the subject to become the totality, but an 
attempt to account for it, for the subject to comprehend their foundation in 
the other. In this respect the absolute is not merely a totality of historical 
contents but a description of the relation, indeed the logical limit of thinking 
in terms of form and content. While the universal can be understood as the 
attempted summation of all particulars, the absolute reveals such a process as 
an abstraction. 
What such a method has to offer the analysis of sexuality is an 
understanding of sexual difference that is both absolute and not absolute, 
such that the tension between the identity and non-identity of the sexual 
subject is a marker of an internal as well as an external negativity. This 
means the lived realities of sexual difference and desire are culturally specific 
and as mutable and open to historical change as any other human activity. 
The understanding of difference can only arise from shared fields of 
significance so anti-essentialism is right on this score. Yet at the same time 
the dimorphic limitations and material structure of the human body, 
particularly in relation to reproduction, mean such lived realities are neither 
limitless nor groundless. Hence anti-essentialism risks becoming anti-
materialism or, more simply, a form of idealism. To avoid overly fixing or 
freeing our understanding of the dialectical potentiality of sexuality, we must 
articulate rather than prioritise body and meaning. We must let our 
understanding arise from the material world and our embodied being in and 
of this world, as well as from how these lived relationships are forged 
through language and their cultural representations. Words must be 
ontologised, made flesh, as much as flesh must be epistemologically 
interrogated. 
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Unfortunately Hegel’s rather naïve teleology of subjective and 
psychological progression often masks the usefulness of the dialectical 
method as a logical description of this far more evolutionary and dynamic 
process. This has resulted in two critical approaches to dialectical negativity. 
On the one hand, as Robert Sinnerbrink (2007: passim) has cogently 
described it, dialectical negativity is accused of offering little but a goal 
directed progressive resolution of such tension towards a totally synthesised 
end point of absolute spirit. The dialectic is accused of having things all 
worked out beforehand and herein lays the terror of synthesis in thinkers 
such as Adorno, Derrida and Deleuze. On the other hand negativity is often 
misrepresented as the same throughout its unfolding such that it is little but a 
perpetual static tension between thesis and antithesis as it is with the initial 
master-slave relationship. The dialectic never as such gets started but is 
merely a repetition of the same. The living complexity of the dialectic which 
moves forward, folds back on itself, makes progress and revisions and 
guarantees nothing is too often reduced to the banal triptych of thesis–
antithesis-synthesis.9 In one history is over before it has begun and in the 
other it never really starts at all. In the former approach, the validation of 
difference over synthesis and the fear that all totalities are totalitarian, 
mistakes the dialectical process as a movement towards unity rather than 
complexity. In the latter it stagnates the dialectic such that it looks like the 
logic of lack. It is this second manoeuvre which Lacan seems to adopt in his 
model of sexual difference; the impossibility of reciprocity in sexual 
relationships seems to mimic the impossibility of reciprocity between the 
master and the slave. However, Lacan is not unique in this reading of the 
dialectic. When Dylan Evans, in his Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 
tells us that Lacan takes the role of recognition in desire ‘from Hegel, via 
Kojève’ (1996: 38) he identifies who I believe is the source of this misreading, 
a misreading which has become almost an orthodoxy in the wider take-up of 
Hegel. 
For Kojève, Hegelian recognition ‘is synonymous with the unequal 
recognition of master and slave. As Robert Williams has suggested, Kojève 
thinks the concept of recognition primarily on the basis of ‘an ontology of 
negation and finitude’. (1997: 11) As if offering a Hegelian prequel to 
Marx’s notion of class struggle as the motor of history, in his Introduction to 
the Reading of Hegel, Kojève demands that Hegel’s notion of history as pure 
struggle in both its logical and actual essence is ‘nothing but the history of 
the dialectic - i.e., active - relation between mastery and slavery’. (1969: 44) 
It is precisely the polar or binary distortion, or as Richard Kearney has 
                                                
9 For an excellent account of this as well as a variety of other ‘myths’ and travesty of 
the dialectic and of Hegel’s thought see Jon Stewart (ed.) The Hegel Myths and 
Legends (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1996). 
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described it, this ‘Cartesian proclivity towards antithesis’,(1998: 120) that 
haunts much that passes for dialectical thought. Kojève explicitly conflates 
recognition and mastery in his description of the master as one who seeks 
recognition ‘in and by a consciousness, of bearing the name of master, of 
being called master’. (1969: 45) The slide from a desire for recognition to a 
desire to be recognised as master hermetically seals off any other more 
positive forms of intersubjective recognition for self-consciousness. The 
implication of Kojève’s reading is that the self-consciousness that wins the 
battle for recognition understood mastery as its goal, as its specifically 
desired form of recognition prior to its experience of such a state. This is to 
give mastery an ideal content outside of the dialectic encounter that generates 
it while simultaneously making the dialectic all about struggle (antithesis) 
and therefore takes little account of development (synthesis). Furthermore 
the emphasis on the externalised struggle of an interpersonal master-slave 
dialectic conceals the no less important intrapersonal consequences of 
Hegel’s model. As Malcolm Bull has argued, ‘in the Phenomenology there are 
repeated references to the splitting of self-consciousness into opposing 
extremes, and to the inescapable mirroring of the one by the other’.(1998: 
101) Hence, both mastery and slavery exist within as well as between 
subjects who are never ontologically static but exist in a constant process of 
both internal and external negation and mediation. Unfortunately, as Robert 
Williams (1997: 364) has suggested, Kojève’s philosophical anthropology 
lent itself almost too vividly to a teleological description of the historical-
political conditions of Europe at the time, hence its take up and dominance is 
not surprising. 
This concentration on lack and the failure of the master’s position 
obscure the real dynamic in the dialectic which is not a simple reversal of 
fortunes, in which slaves could become masters and masters, slaves. Of far 
more importance are the changes that occur to the slave despite them 
remaining a slave. Rather than a reversal or simple repetition of the moment 
of their enslavement, the slave undergoes a step-change in their 
understanding of their condition, a new understanding which radically alters 
their subjective status. Despite their continuing servitude, slaves change their 
understanding of their slavery, they negate the absolute negation of the 
master10 and develop either a stoical or sceptical position in regards to their 
lot in life, which can undergo further evolution into what Hegel described as 
the unhappy consciousness. It is not simply the Hegelian concepts of master 
and the slave, but also of the stoic, the sceptic, and of the unhappy 
consciousness (as well as the underlying logic that articulates their 
                                                
10 That the process of dialectical unfolding so often proceeds via such negation-of-the 
negation offers further evidence that Hegel was well aware that sublation was far 
from a straightforward teleogical process. 
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encounters) which resonate so uncannily with the characters of Happiness 
while throwing a sharp light on the appropriateness of the dialectic as a 
model of sexual difference. So, on the one hand the film seems to present 
male sexuality as a form of failed mastery supporting a rather static, 
ahistorical and almost Promethean model of sexual misery. This would 
appear to be based on an infantile sexuality primarily driven by a 
masturbatory narcissistic aggression (which seems Lacanian). Yet, on the 
other, it actually presents a mode of sexual difference far more in tune with 
the logic of the unhappy consciousness than the master-slave dialectic. In this 
regard it would seem to offers a different mode of non-reciprocity through 
which to model sexual difference, but one that unlike the hierarchical binary 
of the master-slave relationship, presents a potential for sexual similarity 
(despite the continuing absence of a relationship). Whereas the master-slave 
dialectic presents a relationship between identity and difference only at an 
inter-subjective level, the unhappy consciousness also maps an intra-
subjective mode of difference and identity. We now have ‘types’ of slaves 
who can both differ from each other (the stoic versus the sceptic) and become 
the other (the stoic becomes the sceptic). Identity and non-identity now 
becomes both immanent and transcendent, both an intersubjective and 
intrasubjective phenomena. As I shall outline, this four-way split throws 
further light on Lacan.  
 
V 
At one level Happiness seems to suggest that both sexes suffer at the hands of 
male desire as both are in effect enslaved to it, albeit in different ways. This is 
obviously so for the women, who are raped, abandoned and abused, but as 
the men never get to ‘have’ the recognition they desire, they also never really 
gain the status and satisfaction (however fleeting) of the master. Indeed, the 
men’s failure to become the master in many ways seems to reflect Lacan’s 
notion of masculinity as a failure to live up to the demands of the master 
signifier. While this might seem an example of one of the many affinities 
between Hegelian and Lacanian thought there is a sense in which Lacan does 
not follow through on the logical consequences of his claim. What sort of 
failure is this? The general emphasis on the master-slave relationship as the 
logical model through which to map and understand sexual desire and 
difference seems to confuse two distinct modes of failure. It seems to 
subsume the intrinsic failure of the master’s position, the logical impossibility 
of a master subject ever feeling sustained by the recognition of a slave object, 
with the failure to become the master in the first place. Unhappy masters and 
failed masters are however not the same thing, they do not share an identity, 
but a difference. Failed masters are in effect not masters and therefore 
actually have much more in common with slaves, driven as they are by forces 
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which they do not control. Indeed, in many ways, everybody in Happiness 
can be more accurately envisaged as a post-encounter slave, although as we 
shall see, this shared identity as slaves does not in itself preclude difference 
(namely that between the stoic and the sceptic), but accounts for it, albeit at 
a different dialectical order. It is the dialectical development of the post-
encounter slave that we must now turn. 
As Hegel describes it, after a while the slave recognises that the master 
cannot make them believe his or her authority, only experience it.(1977: 119-
122) The master may compel the actions of the slave, but not his or her 
thoughts. The problem for the slave is what to do with such mental freedom, 
incorporated as it is in the very notion of physical bondage. For Hegel, the 
solution that slave consciousness generally adopts is to develop a stoical 
attitude towards its material difficulties. The stoical attitude allows for the 
development of indifference towards the agent’s actual historical and 
material situation. Stoicism reasons, first, if the quality of freedom-of-
thought is determining of the subject as such, it cannot logically be taken 
away, and second, since such freedom-of-thought is independent of the 
historical agents involved in any particular master-slave encounter, the 
essence of this freedom must lie outside the material reality and logic of the 
master-slave dialectic. Human freedom becomes something that is real, yet 
immaterial. A slave cannot be made to think, only to act, so the subject is not 
located in the contingent position of the actual historical-material slave, but 
dwells in the notion of a universal and idealised subject. Taken to the next 
logical step, Hegel suggests that such stoicism develops into scepticism.(123-
126)  
The sceptic reasons that if the slave’s own subjective point of view 
counts for nothing, and yet the slave’s consciousness is formally equivalent to 
any other consciousness, then all points of view can logically be rejected due 
to their equally inherent contingency. The subject is unsure whether he or she 
is mentally enslaved or mentally free and this subjective doubt itself now 
becomes objectively universalised. The sceptic knows that no one knows the 
truth. Yet inherent to this universalising gesture, or indeed any appeal to a 
universal negative truth (in this case, that all knowledge is contingent and 
subjective), is another paradox: how can a subjectively defined truth be 
objectively true? This means that in many ways the stoical position continues 
to hold sway despite the surface sophistry of sceptics. Such agents believe in 
the ‘authority’ of their belief in the ‘absence-of-authority’ precisely because it 
is theirs. This is despite the fact that the form of the authority claimed to 
exist must be blind to its own content, i.e. there is no authority. If sceptics 
own up to this contradiction, and according to Hegel it is hard not to, they 
cease being either sceptics or stoics and develop into what he terms the 
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unhappy consciousness ‘a consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely 
contradictory being’. (126)  
This is a state of consciousness and subjectivity which admits that there 
is no authority in one’s specific contingent set of beliefs, yet still refuses to 
give up these beliefs. If sceptics are caught by their own objective belief in the 
universality of contingent subjectivity (i.e., they actually believe that it is true 
that there is no such thing as truth), the unhappy consciousness is aware of 
the paradox but takes this very rent in their logic to be the reality of lived 
existence and the reality of their own desires. For the unhappy consciousness, 
reality is not true. The split between the content (that which is specifically 
true) and the form (the possibility of truth in general) becomes a frozen 
ahistoric parody of the dynamic logic of our dialectical existence. Things are 
believed or desired for no good reason other than they have been rather than 
they should be. There is no longer a contradiction which can be dialectically 
worked out, but an acceptance of contradiction as a fixed dichotomy which 
is both necessary and determining of the subject as such. Hence, rather than 
demand that the concept of human freedom (or in the case of Happiness, 
sexual satisfaction) be historically materialised in all its potentiality, it is 
declared that the contradiction at the heart of the notion of human freedom 
and sexuality that blocks such a move cannot be escaped and must be lived 
with instead. While this necessary contradiction is experienced as a state of 
crisis, it is equally believed to be a strangely stagnant and permanent, yet 
comforting, state of crisis.  
This is the case of the multiple unhappy consciousnesses that populate 
the narrative of Happiness, in which contemporary (white, bourgeois) 
American society is undoubtedly represented as the society of the unhappy 
consciousness. This society acts as if sexual desire is the master passion 
whose demands must be met, but at the same time does not believe that 
sexual and/or passionate relationships will make them happy. More vitally, 
the unhappy consciousness is materialised as a social totality forever divided 
along gender lines. The feminine subject is the stoical subject, who denies the 
subjective proof of the body and attempts to find the objective proof of their 
freedom in idealised concepts (love, authenticity, happiness). Yet while these 
female stoics continue to seek abstract universals (immaterial passion for 
Kristina, fundamental authenticity for Helen, the actualisation of romantic 
love for Joy) they ignore the vivid particularity of themselves as embodied 
subjects. They can be unloved, left, knocked down, verbally abused, even 
raped, yet none of these brutal material realities seem to affect their idealism. 
However, this also means that they do not believe that any particular 
encounter based on the physical reality of the body will ever be truly 
satisfying. So, when it comes to sex, they cannot even please themselves and 
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hence must be represented as incapable of the autoerotic activities that come 
so naturally to the men.  
Meanwhile, the male subject is represented as the sceptical subject, the 
logical counterpoint of the introverted self-consciousness of the stoic. For the 
sceptic the conceptual notions of truth questioned by the stoic break free 
from any sense of materiality and so there is no longer any trust that a 
physical encounter will not bring satisfaction. So, the problem now is less 
‘why bother?’ than ‘why not?’. For the sceptic, the repetition of disbelief 
renders the subject not merely able but compelled to attempt masturbatory 
satisfaction time and time again, for it is now impossible to dismiss the act a 
priori while the same relentless disbelief always renders the experience as 
inherently unsatisfactory in itself. They suffer a form of autoerotic ‘bad-faith’ 
in which they neither believe nor deny their own sexual self-sufficiency such 
that availability rather than desire is the actual driver of their addictive 
consumption. For the women their aim is too high to ever be met while for 
the men it is too low to be in any sense fulfilling or sustaining, yet they both 
remain wedded to their own cause. In effect the contradictions inherent to 
identity, that it is an unfolding and entwining of identity and non-identity, 
has been reduced to an apriori essence, one that fails to account for the 
unfolding nature of a properly Hegelian essence as that which drives a form 
of becoming rather than determines a mode of being. The Kojèveian mistake 
of placing preformed identities into conflict rather than mapping the 
emergence of figures and logical relations out of such conflicts is repeated. 
So, beneath the narrative’s insistence that sex lies at the heart of this timeless 
chain of human misery are heterosexist stereotypes of sexuality as gendered, 
permanently split, and in the case of men, inherently masturbatory.  
We must not be lulled by the exceptionally fine performances and 
naturalistic shooting style into reading this film as offering a critique of real 
sexual relations, albeit in an exaggerated and dark comedic form. Instead, 
the characters seem at best parodic constructs which have been placed back 
into a social field, rather than offering descriptions of subjects who have been 
extracted from within it. Furthermore, because the representations of 
masturbation are always wretched (and only limited to male characters), we 
must reject any notion that Solondz is offering a truthful recognition or 
realistic portrayal of our autoerotic capacities, despite the seeming radicalism 
of its ejaculatory verisimilitude. Indeed, the film’s unwillingness to represent 
the reality of female masturbation merely emphasizes the binary sexual 
stereotyping on display. At the same time, it is of course the sheer 
concreteness of film, the experience of being shown as opposed to being told, 
that delivers the movies’ peculiar power to reveal experience and play out the 
consequences for different modes of human being. Not only is this experience 
made all the richer by the positive sense of its inexhaustibility, our sense that 
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we can never fully account for this experience, but this power is also 
augmented and framed by the negativity of what is not shown and not told. 
Not telling tends to validate what is shown and in the case of Happiness not 
showing, the not showing of any neutral let alone positive masculine 
autoeroticism and the total absence of any female autoeroticism, validates 
the telling of masculine sexuality as a sorry story of abuse, disappointment 
and despair. So, what looks like an explicit description of what sort of people 
heterosexual men and women are if their sexual desires truly do emerge from 
a fearful and aggressively antithetical desire for recognition, seems closer to a 
prescription. In this autoerotic negativity and absence, Happiness reveals 
both its own and Lacan’s sexual conservatism, not least their shared 
incapacity to deal with autoerotic excess. A better understanding of the 
autoerotic, one that does not limit it to the infantile or the alienated, but is 
equally willing to validate it as concrete evidence of an autonomous capacity 
shared across the gender divide, would therefore seem to have profound 
consequences on the concept of sexual difference as usually conceived. At a 
logical level it is a capacity that seems both essential to our (generalised) 
sexual identity yet not in itself adequate to produce (gendered) sexual 
identity. Hence (if properly included in our model of sexual difference and 
desire) masturbation demands we move away from the static and 
oppositional logic of the master and the slave or at least supplement and 
combine it with the more complex logic of the unhappy consciousness. 
This is not however a claim that we should give up entirely on the 
concept of the master, far from it, but a demand that we don’t simply impose 
it at a universal level on to men. Male sexuality may include a desire to have 
or posses the other but it cannot fully accounted for in these terms.  Neither 
can we equate the Master simply with the sexual drive as a thing in itself, as 
having sex is far from the only form of having on display here. The wider 
social rather than psychic, or indeed sexual meaning of having must also be 
taken into account if we are to understand in what sense and what modes of 
subjectivity we ‘have’ sex. Miller’s reference to the proprietary is of 
significance here as while the ‘pursuit’ of happiness in Happiness is 
overwhelmingly presented as limited to the sexual and emotional realm, it 
should be remembered that the film’s title, particularly in its American 
setting, has a wider resonance. Happiness is after all something enshrined in 
the American constitution as something which the individual has an 
unalienable right to pursue. The problem is what happens when this 
economic claim regarding the having of property is transferred to the sexual 
realm? This I would suggest is the real tragedy of Happiness, as it would 
seem that the economic ‘logic’ of the American Dream, the right of the 
individual to prosper, seems so dominant it is as if the sexual and the 
emotional realms should be approached with the self same logic of 
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individualised market exchange. Sexual happiness becomes a right of the 
individual subject, not the positive consequence of sustaining intersubjective 
relationships. This elision of the sexual with the economic has grim 
consequences for the former, reduced as it is to a relation between competing 
individuals (as opposed to an intersubjective field of mutual recognition). 
Under the influence of capitalist logic, sexuality itself now comes to be 
conceived as essentially individual, that is, masturbatory and/or rapacious. 
Sexuality becomes infantile, and it is treated as an addiction; sex becomes 
‘the problem’.  
This singular economic version of sexual gratification, in combination 
with a permanently bifurcated model of sexual difference, produces a self-
defeating concept of sexual relationships. Now the doubly reactionary 
(rather than radical) and ahistoric credentials of the film emerge. In terms of 
its sexual politics the film seems to long for the authority of the ‘good old 
days’ when men were sexual masters of themselves, as well as others. This is 
why Bill’s confession of paedophilia to Billy is such a pivotal scene. As it is 
played (without humour), it stands out as the least ironic moment of the 
narrative and hence it emphasises the fact that this, Billy’s loss of a ‘proper’ 
father, rather than the failure of the husband and wife relationship, is the 
central tragedy. In this the film seems deeply nostalgic for the authority of 
non-desiring patriarchs. Indeed, it even allows Lenny to maintain his position 
as head of the household in return for him feeling ‘nothing’. Between these 
two extreme modes of fatherhood, the unfeeling and the obscene, the film 
makes its sexual politics clear. While patriarchy is bad, masculinity freed of 
its patriarchal commitments is worse. At the same time, by denying Trish any 
scene or space to convey her emotional trauma, it demonstrates its own 
indifference to the stoical women it creates. Indeed, in their stoicism, it even 
seems to suggest that the women do not suffer with the same intensity of 
feeling as the men. Rather than commend them for trying to get on with life, 
it mocks them.  
By dividing the unhappy consciousness along gender lines, Happiness’ 
sexual logic offers a vision of heterosexuality in-itself that can never be for-
itself. What the film’s sexual logic parallels is central to the notion of gender 
that defines phallocentrism. Satisfaction for women is prohibited by their 
own fixation on the other, while for men it is impossible due to their fixation 
on themselves. This can only be ‘cured’ by men denying their right to 
pleasure and becoming as ‘immaterial’ as the body denying stoical women. In 
both cases gender is presented as intrinsically its own form of pathology, a 
thing that in itself negates the possibility of sexual satisfaction. Or to put a 
Hegelian twist on the dehistoricising pop psychology that drives this 
narrative, sceptics are from Mars and stoics are from Venus.  
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At one level the film presents itself as ‘thinking historically’ as it is very 
much of its time and place, it is almost obsessively ‘contemporary’, 
addressing as it does the most current cultural concerns in terms of big issues 
such as paedophilia as well as paying close attention to minor yet historically 
precise cultural artefacts such as the Tamagochi. This is American suburbia 
in all its pre-millennial tension, this is ‘now’. However, the universalisation 
of the misery on display is also deeply dehistoricising as the possibility of 
either social or sexual revolution is negated via a message of total 
intersubjective failure. Hence despite its apparent criticism of the middle 
classes, the film actually develops a specifically bourgeois notion of a 
universal ‘human condition’. It maintains and mystifies class advantages by 
presenting an endless repetition of failed sexual and emotional encounters 
and alienation, rather than any facet of material exploitation or 
socioeconomic political organisation, as the ‘true’ source of human 
unhappiness. On the one hand, the lost and mourned God of Happiness 
would appear to be patriarchy itself, while on the other its unacknowledged 
God would appear to be capitalist modernity, where the logic of the monadic 
market individual is seen as parasitizing our sexuality. In this regard the 
interest in masturbation in Happiness marks a certain theological sensibility 
within neo-liberal capitalism, one in which the antinomies of market freedom 
expressed at the sexual/social cultural level are felt particularly acutely. Yet, 
while it seems to agree with the fundamental critique of heteronormative 
phallocentric ideology as a formation incapable of encouraging true human 
happiness, it equally claims that nothing can be done about it. We are 
‘naturally’ unhappy, because the contemporary experience of the sexualised 
unhappy consciousness is an ontological, rather than political, ‘truth’. I 
would suggest this is also the fundamental problem with psychoanalysis in 
general and Lacan in particular. First he confuses a historical description of 
sexuality’s tortuous relationship with market logic for a logical description of 
the psyche as such and second, he deploys a restricted and static version of 
dialectical logic to do so. 
However, what if rather than a manifestation of lack the autoerotic is a 
form of excess, an abundance that brings into question the totalisation of 
lack within the Lacanian schema of sexual desire? Furthermore, if modes of 
recognition and dialectical negativity are not premised on lack, how does this 
contribute to our understanding of sexual difference neither as a hostile 
binary or blank dichotomy but as a genuine dialectic, one that allows for 
identity and non-identity. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty claimed: 
 
To treat sexuality as a dialectic is not to make a process of knowledge 
out of it, nor to identify a man’s history with the history of his 
consciousness. The dialectic is not a relationship between contradictory 
and inseparable thoughts; it is the tending of an existence towards 
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another existence which denies it, and yet without which it is not 
sustained. (1962: 167) 
 
It is as existences that we share much that is irreducible to our gendered 
identities, not least our common need and capacity for sexual and emotional 
recognition which is clearly not as universally impossible or dreary as this 
film might suggest. Indeed, to sneer too quickly at the normative aspects of 
romantic comedies like Pillow Talk is to ignore the utopian desire for loving 
sexual relationships that they express. The synthesis between the couple in 
such films may well be produced by an ideological sleight of hand that masks 
some very suspect sexual politics, but this does not detract from an 
underlying structure that is well aware that sexual relations, even such 
apparently heteronormative sexual relations, are culturally negotiated rather 
than unproblematically ‘natural’. Indeed, once our desire for recognition, 
sexual or otherwise, comes to be acknowledged and negotiated, once the 
unhappy consciousness accepts the death of its crippled Gods and cedes all 
authority to its encounter with the other, the recognition they both give and 
receive suddenly becomes the mechanism which generates a new and non-
exploitative form of dialectical human relationship - love. As Hegel described 
it, ‘Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another 
so that I am not in selfish isolation but win my self-consciousness only as the 
renunciation of my independence, and by knowing myself as the unity of 
myself with another and of the other with me’. (1967:261)  
While such mutual recognition in the interpersonal sense is clearly no 
guarantee of freedom in any wider socio-economic and material sense, it 
seems hard to imagine any form of real freedom or happiness without it. 
Most of us, regardless of gender and sexual orientation, seek satisfying 
sexual and emotional relationships, hence to claim (as Happiness seems to) 
that the notion of love itself is at best chimerical and at worst delusional is 
no less idealistic and infantile than to claim that love conquers all. The 
historical nature of love and sex (and the recognition of its potential to 
sustain as well as destroy) indicates that, while having a sexual relationship is 
not a sufficient condition for human happiness, it is seen by the majority of 
people as a desirable one, even if only for part of our lives. The length and 
forms of such unions are in this respect far less important than the fact that 
they do ‘exist’. At the same time however, this does not negate any potential 
we may have for self sufficiency - whether at an emotional or sexual level. 
Indeed, if love is the overcoming of the denial of the other, the sustenance we 
receive from a genuine encounter, it must in fact be premised on a free 
choice. We are neither saved by the other nor are we totally lost without 
them. Sexuality is therefore an essence, or better still a ground, that neither 
restricts nor prescribes us. While it has no capacity to magically synthesise 
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away the contradictions it brings into being, the disruptions it brings forth 
are a marker of its richness not of its incoherence. Life is not reducible to sex, 
but sex is an expression of life. A psychoanalytic response to this reversal or 
repositioning of the sexual under a wider ontological framework would be 
instructive as it would allow for modes of identity that are shared across or 
in excess of sexual difference and sexual orientation without simply 
prioritising these over modes of difference. The fundamental consequence of 
the dialectical relationship between identity and non-identity is to ask that 
difference must take account of non-difference. Similarly it counters the 
universalisation of lack as the only driving force that can articulate such 
relationships. In the end Lacan’s notion of sexual difference is too wedded to 
a structural lack to take account of the existential richness of human sexual 
being: our differences, our similarities, and our contradictions. As Hegel 
concludes more generally with regard to the lived realities of contradiction, 
‘finite things, therefore, in their indifferent multiplicity are simply this, to be 
contradictory and disrupted within themselves and to return to their ground’. 
(Hegel citied in Pipin 1996: 250)  
Both our own and cinema’s fascination with sexuality is more than a 
symptom of a pathological and unfulfillable desire to find a sexual antithesis; 
it is also a reminder of our grounding in a realm which allows for our 
capacity to find satisfaction in an ability to give rather than to have and it is 
the acceptance of this need to give that we find moments of sexual synthesis. 
In this respect, despite the normative outcome, Pillow Talk might actually 
represent our dialectical capacity to form sexual relationships more 
accurately than Happiness, not because sexual relationships inevitably lead 
to happiness, nor that they necessarily maintain themselves, but because it 
acknowledges our hope that this is still, at least, a possibility.  
 
  
Film-Philosophy 15.1  2011 
 
 




Bull, Malcolm (1998) ‘Slavery and the Multiple Self.’ New Left Review, 231.  
Butler, Judith (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity. London: Routledge. 
Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. 
London: Routledge.  
Evans, Dylan (1996) An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge.  
Fink, Bruce (1995) The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. 
Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Freud, Sigmund (1977) On Sexuality. London: Pelican.  
Glitre, Kathrina (2006) Hollywood Romantic Comedy: States of the Union 
1934-65. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Grosz, Elisabeth (1990) Jacques Lacan, A Feminist Introduction. London: 
Routledge. 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1967) Philosophy of Right. London: Oxford University Press.  
Hegel, G.W.F. (1977) Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Irigaray, Luce (1985) Speculum of the Other Woman. Ithaca: Cornel 
University Press. 
Kearney, Richard (1998) Poetics of Imagining: Modern to Postmodern. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Kojève, Alexandre (1969) Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Lacan, Jaques (1999) Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX 
(1972 - 1973). New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co. 
Laqueur, Thomas (2003) Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation. 
New York: Zone Books. 
Lewis Allen, Peter (2000) The Wages of Sin: Sex and Disease, Past and 
Present. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1962) Phenomenology of Perception. London: 
Routledge. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1968) The Visible and the 
Invisible. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Film-Philosophy 15.1  2011 
 
 
Film-Philosophy | ISSN: 1466-4615   
 
62 
McNally, David (2001) Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labour 
and Liberation. Albany: SUNY Press. 
Miller, Jacques-Alain (2000) ‘On Semblances in the Relationship between the 
Sexes’, in Renata Salecl, (ed.) Sexuation: Sic 3. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Nye, Robert (ed.) (1999) Sexuality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pippin, Robert (1996) ‘Hegel’s Metaphysics and the Problem of 
Contradiction’ in Jon Stewart (ed.) The Hegel Myths and Legends. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Salecl, Renata (ed.) (2000) Sexuation: Sic 3.Durham: Duke University Press, 
2000.  
Sandford, Stella (1999) ‘Contingent Ontologies: Sex, Gender and “Woman”’ 
in Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Butler’ Radical Philosophy 97.  
Sinnerbrink, Robert (2007) Understanding Hegelianism. Stocksfield: 
Acumen. 
Stewart, Jon (ed.) (1996) The Hegel Myths and Legends. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Taylor, Timothy (1997) The Prehistory of Sex: Four Million Years of Human 
Sexual Culture. London: Fourth Estate. 
Williams, Robert R. Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Wright, Elizabeth. Psychoanalytic Criticism: A Reappraisal. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Žižek, Slavoj. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.  
Žižek, Slavoj. (1999) The Ticklish Subject. London: Verso.  
 
Filmography 
Happiness (Todd Solondz, USA, 1998). 
Pillow Talk (Michael Gordon, USA, 1959). 
 
